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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
v.
)
)
THOMAS EDWARD LANDERS, )
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
______________________________)

NO. 45502
BANNOCK COUNTY NO. CR 2017-1082

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Subsequent to Mr. Landers’ plea to the crime of aggravated battery, the district court
sentenced Mr. Landers to a unified term of ten years, with five years fixed. Mr. Landers
thereafter filed a Notice of Appeal, followed by an Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion, which the
district court denied. On appeal, Mr. Landers contends the district court abused its discretion
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through imposition of an excessive sentence without full and proper consideration of
Mr. Landers’ mental illness and mitigation evidence.1

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
On February 2, 2017, Mr. Thomas Landers and Mr. David Grasser got into an altercation
outside of the Wendy’s Restaurant in Pocatello, Idaho. Mr. Landers was upset with Mr. Grasser,
because he learned that Mr. Grasser had recently beat up his wife, Charlene Grasser, with whom
Mr. Landers was having an affair. (Confidential Certificate of Exhibits, a/k/a Presentence
Investigation, (“PSI”), pp.5-9.) Mr. Grasser had a history of domestic abuse against Charlene,
and had stolen from Mr. Landers in the past. (PSI, p.6.) Mr. Grasser contended that he was
walking through the parking lot when he saw Mr. Landers in a vehicle. As Mr. Landers exited
the vehicle and approached, Mr. Grasser took out his knife, and then slipped on the ice and fell.
Mr. Grasser reported that Mr. Landers then stabbed him with an ice pick. (R., pp.19-20.)
When Mr. Landers was questioned by police, he was belligerent and defensive, but
eventually admitted he wanted to confront Mr. Grasser because he regularly beat Charlene, and
had pushed her that day, and barricaded her in the bedroom to prevent her from leaving and
calling the police. (PSI, pp.5-9.) Charlene confirmed that on that day, her son,

, had run

across the street to Mr. Landers’ residence to ask him for help with Mr. Grasser, but when
Mr. Landers arrived at her home, Mr. Grasser had already fled.

(PSI, p.6.)

Mr. Landers

thereafter came into contact with Mr. Grasser in the Wendy’s parking lot. Mr. Landers intended
to get out of the vehicle to confront Mr. Grasser and challenge him to fight against a man, not a

1

Mr. Landers filed a Rule 35(a) Motion to Correct an Illegal Sentence, contending the district
court erred by failing to order a mental health evaluation pursuant to I.C. § 19-2522.
Mr. Landers does not challenge the court’s March 2, 2018, denial on appeal.
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woman (as Mr. Grasser did with Charlene Grasser). He saw that Mr. Grasser pulled out a fixed
blade Kershaw knife from a sheath on his belt and Mr. Landers grabbed an ice pick located in the
vehicle. (PSI, p.8.) Once they were in contact in the parking lot, Mr. Grasser slashed at
Mr. Landers, cutting Mr. Landers’ right thumb. Mr. Landers then stabbed Mr. Grasser with the
ice pick in the left chest/armpit area. (R., pp.19-20; PSI, p.7.) Mr. Grasser was taken to the
hospital for a collapsed lung and was stabilized. (R., p.19.) During a subsequent search of
Mr. Landers’ residence, police found a broken glass methamphetamine pipe with suspected
residue. (R., p.21.)
Mr. Landers was arrested and charged with aggravated battery, use of a deadly weapon in
the commission of the aggravated battery, and possession of a controlled substance,
methamphetamine. (R., pp.61-63.) On June 12, 2017, Mr. Landers executed a plea form and
entered a guilty plea to Aggravated Battery in exchange for the State’s dismissal of the drug
charge and the weapons enhancement. (R., pp.91-97.) Mr. Landers entered his plea with an
explanation, explaining he felt harassed by Mr. Grasser over the years, and upset over the battery
against Charlene the morning of the incident, that it was self-defense or an accident due to his
slipping on the ice, and that he had “lost his head.” (Tr., p.9, Ln.25 – p.10, Ln.13; p.11, Ls.4-8.)
Mr. Landers further advised the court that he had been counseled and treated for bipolar disorder,
manic depression, and schizophrenia, and had been taking medication for the same for several
years, and that he felt able to proceed with his plea hearing. (Tr. p.7, Ln.16 – p.8, Ln.14.)
Subsequent to his plea, and as part of the preparation for his PSI, Mr. Landers underwent
a GAIN-I assessment in June 2017, several months prior to his sentencing hearing, which
revealed diagnoses of stimulant use disorder-amphetamine type, severe; major depressive
disorder, recurrent, with psychotic features; generalized anxiety disorder; unspecified somatic
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symptom and related disorders; and post-traumatic stress disorder or acute stress disorder or
other disorder of extreme stress. (PSI, p.31.) The GAIN also contained the admonishment,
“Prompt: Reconcile self-report vs. staff impression on DSM-5/ICD-10 Diagnosis and Other
Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention.” (PSI, p.31.) At the original sentencing
hearing on August 28, 2017, the court acknowledged Mr. Landers’ physical health issues, and
postponed the hearing such that the victim, Mr. Grasser, had a further opportunity to be present.
(Tr., p.14, Ls.5-6: “Are you feeling okay, Mr. Landers? You’re not going to pass out on me
today?”)
Mr. Landers was sentenced on September 6, 2017, to a ten year unified term, with five
years determinate. (R., pp.123-125.) He then timely appealed. (R., pp.131-134, 162-163.)
Mr. Landers also filed a Rule 35(a) motion, contending the district court erred by failing to order
a mental health evaluation under I.C. §19-2522, which the court denied. (R., pp.131-132.)2 On
appeal, Mr. Landers contends the district court erred by unreasonably failing to give due
consideration to his mental health and other mitigating evidence when it imposed the ten year
term.

ISSUES
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed a unified sentence of ten years, with
five years determinate, upon Mr. Landers following his conviction for aggravated assault?

2

Mr. Landers simultaneously filed a motion to augment the record with the court’s March 2,
2018, Order Denying Defendant’s Rule 35(a) Motion, which is attached hereto, and will be
referred to in this brief as “Order.”
4

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed A Unified Sentence Of Ten Years,
With Five Years Fixed, Upon Mr. Landers Following His Plea Of Guilty To Aggravated Battery.
Mr. Landers asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of ten years,
with five years fixed, is excessive.

Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court

imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review
of the record giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and
the protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, an
appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the court imposing
the sentence.’” State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho
573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Landers does not allege that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.
Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Landers must show that in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The
governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment considered by a sentencing court include:
(1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the
possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982). In this case, Mr. Landers’ sentence is unreasonable and
excessive because the district court failed to properly consider Mr. Landers’ mental health as a
significant factor at sentencing, as well as other mitigating evidence.
Pursuant to I.C. § 19-2523, a sentencing court is required to consider a defendant’s
mental health at sentencing. That section mandates the following:
(1) Evidence of mental condition shall be received, if offered, at the time of
sentencing of any person convicted of a crime. In determining the sentence to be
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imposed in addition to other criteria provided by law, if the defendant’s mental
condition is a significant factor, the court shall consider such factors as:
(a) The extent to which the defendant is mentally ill;
(b) The degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment;
(c) The prognosis for improvement or rehabilitation;
(d) The availability of treatment and level of care required;
(e) Any risk of danger which the defendant may create for the public, if at
large, or the absence of such risk;
(f) The capacity of the defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of law at the time of the
offense charged.
Although the court need not recite each of the aforementioned factors when fashioning a
sentence where a defendant’s mental condition is a significant factor, it must nonetheless
adequately consider the substance of the factors in arriving at its decision. State v. Strand, 137
Idaho 457, 461 (2002). Despite this mandate, it is clear that the trial court did not sufficiently
consider Mr. Landers’ mental health at sentencing or address each of these factors.
(Tr., generally.) See also Hollon v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). In fact, as revealed in the
Rule 35 order, the trial court determined Mr. Landers’ mental condition was not a significant
factor at sentencing and gave short shrift to his condition even though there were major and
obvious mental health concerns. (Order, p.7.) The district court was alerted to these mental
health concerns several times before sentencing. Mr. Landers relayed via his plea form that he
had previously been diagnosed with bipolar disorder, manic depression, and schizophrenia, and
was taking Zyprexa and Tegratol. (R., p.93.) During the plea colloquy, when questioned by the
court about mental illness, Mr. Landers explained that he was diagnosed as such since 2001, and
had been taking medication since then. (Tr., p.7, Ln.16 – p.8, Ln.1-9.) He also referred to
himself as mentally disabled. (Tr., p.11, Ls.11-16.) Once the PSI report was prepared, more
expansive information regarding Mr. Landers’ mental health was received by the court
demonstrating his mental health played a major role.
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The police report included information from Mr. Landers’ neighbor, who referred to the
defendant as “Tommy,” and stated “’Tommy’ was ‘crazy’ and had been outside the night before
[the incident] screaming and yelling.” (PSI, p.5.) During his police contact, his behavior was
aggressive and erratic, and not the sane behavior one would expect of someone being confronted
by police officers in uniform. (PSI, p.5.) This suggests Mr. Landers’ mental stability was
questionable on the day or the days leading up to the incident. During his GAIN evaluation,
Mr. Landers advised his Zyprexa medication was not working, and that he had been diagnosed
with anxiety, bipolar, schizoaffective disorder and blackout rage. (PSI, pp.29, 37.) He described
being placed in a psychiatric facility in the past. (PSI, p.20.) He had attempted suicide at least
nine times. (PSI, pp.20, 37.) Mr. Landers also relayed that he had suffered 48 seizures while
being incarcerated, and had suffered a head injury in his 20’s. (PSI, pp.18-20.)
Mr. Landers’ mental condition warranted further examination by the GAIN evaluators
and full recognition by the court. The following phrase was stated three times in the GAIN
report: “Prompt: Reconcile self-report vs. staff impression on DSM-5/ICD-10 Diagnosis and
Other Conditions That May Be a Focus of Clinical Attention.” (PSI, pp.30-31.) This warning
went unheeded.

In the evaluator’s opinion, Mr. Landers would continue to struggle with

symptoms without some form of treatment. (PSI, p.41.) The record also stated Mr. Landers had
been receiving social security disability since 2001 due to his mental health. (PSI, p.18.) This
degree of mental illness rose to the level of a “significant factor at sentencing.” See State v.
Black, 161 Idaho 867, 869 (Ct. App. 2017) (finding trial court erred by denying request for
psychological evaluation where defendant’s mental illness was a “significant factor” based upon
his self-report, as well as a GAIN assessment revealing several clinical disorders including
bipolar disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, recurrent major depressive disorder, and attention-
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deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD), where evaluator merely provided a recommendation to
“coordinate” treatment.)
Mr. Landers’ imposed sentence does not suitably reflect the extent of his mental illness,
the degree of illness or defect and level of functional impairment, his prognosis for improvement
or rehabilitation, the availability of treatment and level of care required, or Mr. Landers’ capacity
to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law as required by I.C. §19-2523(a)(b)(c)(d)(f). This is documented by the court’s order denying
Mr. Landers’ Rule 35(a) motion for correction of an illegal sentence for failure to order a mental
health evaluation under § 2522. Although in the Order, the district court was responding to the
Rule 35 motion, its comments are nonetheless instructive in demonstrating its focus and thought
process at the sentencing hearing. See State v. Anderson, 152 Idaho 21, 23 (Ct. App. 2011)
(finding error because the district court did not fully understand the scope of its discretion at
sentencing, based upon statements made in the Rule 35 order) (emphasis added).

The court

stated:
Here, it is not clear from the record that the Court was on notice of the
defendant’s mental health issues, or that these issues were a key factor in the
defendant’s commission of the crime. . . . In fact, the only indication in the record,
other than the PSI, that suggests a history of mental health issues is that Landers
asked the Court for a temporary furlough to meet with a physician at Health West
for a medical and medication evaluation to address seizures. . . . Therefore, at no
point before sentencing was the Court on notice that Landers had mental health
issues, or that any mental health issues would be a significant factor at sentencing.
(Order, pp.6-7.)

Through these comments, it appears the court unreasonably valued

Mr. Landers’ major mental illness, mental health needs, and history of trauma, as a minor
sentencing factor and a character defect by further stating, “[i]It is clear from the record that the
underlying conduct in this case was related to drug abuse and that the conduct is not a deviation
from Landers’ prior violent history and character.” (Order, p.6.)
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Outside of Mr. Landers’ mental health, there was other mitigating evidence before the
court, including his acceptance of responsibility, his unique lifelong experiences, substance
abuse, and willingness to undergo treatment.

Contrary to the PSI evaluator’s opinion,

Mr. Landers did accept responsibility for his actions. He did this by entering a plea rather than
going to trial, even though he disputed the facts and believed to some extent that he was
defending himself or Charlene Grasser. (See R., generally.) Acknowledgement of guilt and
acceptance of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See
State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812, 815 (Ct. App. 2010). Mr. Landers also suffered a very traumatic
childhood. His mother was illiterate, lived on welfare and frequently drank, and there were
many men with whom his mother was involved who came in and out of his life. (PSI, p.15.)
Mr. Landers reported that he had twenty full-blooded siblings (many of whom are now
deceased), yet he, unlike his siblings, was named after a man his mother dated. He never met his
biological father and lived on a houseboat the first ten years or so of his life. (PSI, p.15.)
Overall, he suffered a deprived and bleak childhood.
Mr. Landers has suffered from substance abuse for much of his life, yet demonstrated a
moderate level of motivation for change. (PSI, p.41.) Courts have recognized that substance
abuse can be a mitigating factor in sentencing. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 645 P.2d 323 (1982).
Mr. Landers is very dedicated to his sobriety and his amenability to treatment should be
considered a mitigating factor. (PSI, p.41.) See, e.g., State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209
(Ct. App. 1991).

Lastly, Mr. Landers suffers from some medical ailments, which have

contributed to repeated seizures. The brain injury he sustained in a car accident “has contributed
to this [current legal] difficulty,” and Mr. Landers apparently previously passed out in court.
(PSI, p.18; R., p.14, Ls.5-10.)
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In sum, when the district court imposed a unified ten-year term, and failed to fully
consider the mitigating evidence including emphasizing Mr. Landers’ mental health as a
significant factor, it failed to “balance the goals of retribution, protection of society and
deterrence against the defendant’s potential for rehabilitation.” State v. Douglas, 118 Idaho 622,
624, 798 P.2d 467, 469 (Ct. App. 1990). Mr. Landers’ sentence was longer than necessary to
protect society, provide rehabilitation, and exact punishment, and it was not uniquely tailored to
take into account the extent of his mental illness or his future needs.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Landers respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 19th day of April, 2018.

__________/s/_______________
LARA E. ANDERSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 19th day of April, 2018, I served a true and correct
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT’S BRIEF, by causing a copy thereof to be placed in the U.S.
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THOMAS EDWARD LANDERS
INMATE #124529
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STEPHEN S DUNN
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
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